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Introduction to the PhD Thesis:
”Policy Interventions in Credit Markets
with Imperfect Information”
The Thesis consists of 4 chapters. Each of these corresponds to a distinct
research paper in the two following main topics:
- asymmetric information in the credit market and
- rationale for the presence of trade unions.
The former topic is discussed in the first 3 papers while the latter in the
additional paper.
The first chapter, “Asymmetric Information in The Credit Mar-
ket and Unemployment Benefit as a Screening Device”, analyzes
the principal-agent relationship in the case of asymmetric information in the
credit market. It is based on the classic1 Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) in the adverse
selection setting. The two authors have plainly shown how the rationing can
occur in markets (the credit one is a practical example) where the contract-
ing parties have different information about the terms of the transactions.
To avoid credit rationing, and a lower entrepreneurial activity and economic
growth (especially in less developed countries), some economists have sug-
gested several policy interventions.
1The cited literature refers to each paper bibliography.
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Mankiw (1987), for example, suggests that public transfers, such as invest-
ment subsidies, may produce improvements on the market solution. De Meza-
Webb, instead, show how an investment tax can alleviate the over-investment
problem occurring in the particular scenario they imagine. Curiously, very
few other papers investigate on other possible sovereign interventions. One
of these is Minelli-Modica (2003) that point out the availability of collateral
as the most efficient device for entrepreneurs to signal their project quality
(“good” or “bad”). Hence, they propose the government should intervene,
when potential entrepreneurs do not have enough collateral to start up a
firm, directly providing the required sum. The two authors then compare
the cost of their proposal with the ones generated by the two most widely
used policy interventions in less developed countries, that is interest rate sub-
sidy and investment subsidy. They conclude showing their policy, along with
the interest rate subsidy, is the cheapest for the government to implement.
Unfortunately, the three policies cited by Minelli-Modica produce pooling
equilibria with all types of firms (“good” and “bad”) being financed. This
is not an efficient solution, from a social viewpoint, if the bad projects have
a negative expected net value (that is they produce less than the resources
exploited).
To solve these inefficiencies, in this first paper, the government is assumed to
intervene by offering an unemployment benefit to all potential entrepreneurs
in order to encourage the bad ones not to ask for a loan. The main contribu-
tion of the paper is the analysis between the inefficiencies suffered in a given
market (here, the credit one) and possible solutions generated by focusing
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on other, apparently distant, markets. If we do not treat the credit market
in isolation, we have the possibility to observe other interesting features: the
unemployment benefit produces separating equilibria in the sense that only
good firms get a loan. Moreover, this policy is in general cheaper than the
other alternatives (although it is not essential for the analysis to compare
policies that produce different results in terms of “types” financed).
The second paper, “Redistribution as a Device for Total Screen-
ing in a Credit Market with Adverse Selection”, is again based on
Stiglitz-Weiss (1981). The model describes the effects a redistribution of
initial assets can have on the given informational structure. It is assumed
that some potential firms do not have the collateral required by banks to
separate types. Through the redistribution, the government assures to each
entrepreneur the same level of collateral and, at the same time, it allows
the bank to screen “all” types of projects. If (and only if) the total initial
wealth is not enough to guarantee the same amount to each prospective en-
trepreneurs, the authority is actually demanded to provide public money.
Again we derive separating equilibria with only good firms financed. The
bad ones do not ask for a loan just to preserve their “new” endowment.
The redistribution policy turns out to be, in general, cheaper than other
possible alternatives. This gives an idea about the actual viability of this
kind of interventions. Furthermore, when the total output, generated by
“all and only” good firms, is high enough to repay those who initially had
more than the new “egalitarian” income, we certainly avoid concerns about
pareto-efficiency and production incentives.
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The third paper, “Moral Hazard in the Credit Market: the Case
of Italy after the Law n. 142/2001”, analyzes the economic results pro-
duced by partially modifying the law on firm bankruptcy. The model com-
pares the moral hazard problems faced by a bank when, for limited funds,
it has to finance either a labor-managed firm (LMF ) or a profit maximizing
one (PMF ). Before the law n. 142/2001, a cooperator in a LMF could only
be either an entrepreneur or a simple subordinate worker, but not both. Now
the two position has been grouped and the LMF members can clearly benefit
from the legislative worker protection in case of firm liquidation. In other
words, we know that, in case of bankruptcy, moneylenders are entitled to be
satisfied on all movable properties only after the subordinate labor credits
(having a high priority). So, each cooperator, with respect to the twin PMF
entrepreneur, is allowed to recover his labor income that can “unfairly” con-
tain some entrepreneurial profits. As a result, labor-managed firms hardly
get a loan because the lenders have a lower probability to be repaid. Besides,
the law has clearly raised the moral hazard problem on the effort contribu-
tion of LMF members.
The main contribution of the paper refers to the relationship between leg-
islative interventions and asymmetric information in the credit market. The
model shows that with a simple reform on the bankruptcy law, LMF coop-
erators can alleviate the moral hazard problem and improve their reputation
as “good” debtors.
The additional paper, “How Trade Unions Promote Cooperation
among Workers”, studies one of the possible explanations for the presence
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of trade unions in the labor market: the apparent wage rigidity may, in fact,
be the outcome of a non-cooperative game between the members of a trade
union. The model shows that a trade union produces a positive “insurance
effect” simply by reducing the variance of each member expected income.
To achieve this result, it is assumed the trade union asks a membership fee
to each employed (reducing the monopolistic union wage), and provides a
subsidy to the unemployed (raising the reservation wage). With respect to
the solution provided by Solow (1990), the present paper tries to develop two
important points:
- the actual possibility, thanks to the trade union, of a wage above the com-
petitive level without assuming it as exogenously given (is it possible, from a
general equilibrium standpoint, to assume a wage over the competitive level
without a proper explanation?);
- the risky nature of each period expected income. The workers are considered
risk-averse and not risk-neutral. It obviously is a more realistic assumption
(do not workers realize they face a simple lottery every period between a
monopolistic and a reservation wage?). Moreover, the risk aversion allows to
explain the higher expected utility derived from a reduction on the variance
of each worker expected income.
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Asymmetric Information in the Credit Market
and Unemployment Benefit as a
Screening Device
Francesco Reito ∗
Abstract
We consider an economy where firms/entrepreneurs are differ-
ent in terms of unobservable projects quality. Adverse selection
in the credit market forces creditors to ask for collateral when
potential debtors have sufficient wealth. We study the interac-
tion between credit and labor market when entrepreneurs have no
(even illiquid) wealth to offer as a collateral requirement. Both
pooling and no contract at all are possible equilibrium outcomes
depending on the proportion of good firms and the expected net
value for banks on low quality projects.
To solve the inefficiencies, different policies are available for
the government to implement. If we do not treat the credit market
in isolation, it becomes also possible to focus on the labor market:
We propose an unemployment benefit to low quality types to
encourage them to offer their labor forces rather than asking for a
loan. The policy cost is then compared to the often cited interest
rate subsidy offered to banks to reach a minimum profitability
from pooling contracts.
JEL classification: D81; D82; H53.
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1 Introduction
From the seminal paper of Stiglitz-Weiss [17], the literature on credit market
and asymmetric information, demonstrates, with a few exceptions, the pos-
sibility of credit rationing equilibria. It is not always appropriate, anyway,
to consider the credit market in isolation. In particular, if we take into ac-
count the possibility for the potential entrepreneurs to offer their force in the
labor market, we would possibly be able to separate types without the inef-
ficiency of the rationing. In this paper a simple model of the credit market
is proposed. The bank’s actions and the policy interventions are influenced
by what happens in the labor market. The workers expected income affects
the individual’s choice (whether to be a worker or an entrepreneur) and,
consequently, the borrowers pool faced by the banks.
In the proposed model, the potential entrepreneurs differ in their expected
final returns. We assume for simplicity that there are only two types of
firms/entrepreneurs with two different projects. The bank faces an adverse
selection problem for the firm type is private information.
In the available literature1, collateral can be used as a screening device.
Banks have the possibility to offer a contract for each type with different
collateral and interest rate requirements. The good project firm, so, is able
to put up a larger (even illiquid or not usable as a monetary investment)
sum as a signal, asking, at the same time, for a lower interest rate payment.
Anyway not all the potential firms/entrepreneurs have enough (even illiquid)
1See, for examples: Bester[5], De Meza and Webb[9] and Innes[12].
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money to use. In underdeveloped regions, for example, a situation where the
banks grant a few loans with higher interest rates in the absence of external
wealth, is easily observable. In these cases, and, in particular, if one project
has a negative expected value and if the proportion of good firms is not high
enough, the optimal response from the credit institution is to stop financing
and leaving even the good firms without the possibility to start up the project.
The only way to escape from the sub-optimal, stable equilibrium is the
participation of a sovereign authority as to modify players payoffs. A common
policy intervention is to offer an interest rate subsidy to banks to let all the
firms operating, with a rent gained by low project types.
Another possible policy, the one exploited in this paper, could be that of
presenting a gift to bad entrepreneurs (as an unemployment benefit) if they
choose not to ask for a loan and remain in the labor market as workers. If
the bad entrepreneurs find it convenient to be simple workers, the banks will
end up by facing no adverse selection problems.
This time the borrowers pool would be formed only by high quality firms
and we also gain a separating equilibrium contract without any losses2.
The final (expected) cost of implementing this unemployment benefit pol-
icy is then compared to the interest rate subsidy one, showing a large pa-
rameters space range of policy cheapness. Finally, we take into account the
expected income of workers as a category to prove it is better to work only
for good firms.
2With the interest rate subsidies, we only reach pooling equilibria with both kinds of
firms operating.
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The aim of the paper is to show how the optimal response of the authority
to credit market inefficiencies is not only the one of giving subsidies to the
bank or firm sectors. With respect to the relevant literature, this paper
tries to develop the idea of solving the failures of a given market, focusing
on another one. In our case, to avoid credit rationing we study the labor
market conditions of who is potentially entitled to start up a firm.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The basic model is presented
in section 2. Section 3 computes the principal credit market equilibria un-
der asymmetric information in the two cases of entrepreneurs’ initial wealth
sufficient to pose collateral and not. Section 4 concludes proposing the un-
employment benefit policy as a screening device.
2 The Model
There are two types of entrepreneurs with two different projects, H and L;
both require a monetary investment of I to begin operating;
Consider the same production function for each firm with two arguments,
one entrepreneur and one employee3, but with different final expected return:
Exp[y] = f(1 entrepreneur, 1 worker) =

phh for entrepreneur H,
pll for entrepreneur L.
3It is of course possible to extend the case to n workers for each firm. This may prove
helpful in the welfare comparisons of Section 4.
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In words, project H (high quality one) succeeds with probability ph and
yields a return of h, whereas with probability 1−ph it fails and yields nothing.
The other entrepreneur has a riskier project, L, that yields, in case of success,
a return, l, greater than h, but with a probability, pl, smaller than ph. Project
H, in any case, has an higher expected return hph > lpl.
Assume project H has a strictly positive net value (from banks’ view-
point): hph > I, and project L to give even a negative expected value (lpl ≥ I
or lpl < I).
The firms/entrepreneurs have insufficient wealth to start the projects
and need an outside financing. Consider a bank with imperfect informa-
tion about the entrepreneurs type. We examine very briefly the case where
the entrepreneurs have sufficient wealth to use as a screening signal and then
analyze the case of policy implementation when the firms cannot offer a
collateral because their wealth is too low.
A contract between the bank and the entrepreneur specifies the amount
advanced by the bank, that is I, and a couple (R,C) where R is the amount
the firm has to repay if the return is positive and C is the collateral required
in the case of bankruptcy.
Notice that with full information, the optimal contracts are (h, 0) for
type H and (l, 0) for type L, and remember that if firm’s profits were fully
observable by the bank, the latter could offer a share finance contract and
attain the first best in any case.
Take, for the remainder, the following list of the main assumptions used
throughout the paper:
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Meaning of risky : The riskier project L is a mean preserving spread of
project H in the sense analyzed by Stiglitz and Weiss[17]. If we assumed
a mean first order domination (see for this case De Meza and Webb[9] and
Innes[12]), with only two possible outcomes and in particular with firms
wealth equal to zero, any contract would be always accepted by both types.
This is in a certain sense the version of the paper where the bad firms have
a negative expected value for the banks.
Fixed loan size: The firms demand an identical loan of I. This situation
could be adequate to analyze credit loans to a pool of firms with similar
project size. If the firms can ask different loan size contracts (as in Innes[12]),
this information could be used to screen types. In these cases it is difficult,
anyway, to reach the full separation4.
Monopolistic bank : The bank is considered to be monopolistic; most of the
literature on credit rationing considers the credit market to be competitive.
For underdeveloped regions, anyway, a monopolistic bank could be a better
assumption to describe the prevalent credit behavior and the higher interest
rate contracts with respect to richer regions5. Considering the credit sector
as competitive gives also the difficulty of the non existence of an unequivocal
notion of competitive equilibrium in models with adverse selection.
Risk neutrality : All the agents are considered risk neutral. This sim-
plifying assumption assures the possibility of using the collateral to screen
4It is a good approximation of the case of Southern Italy where around 75 percent of
firms who ask for loans are very small. See [13].
5The high spread between Italian regions (See [14]) is a plain evidence.
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types under asymmetric information. Stiglitz and Weiss [17] and [18] have
shown that this property may disappear in a model of adverse selection where
agents have different degrees of risk aversion. More risk averse entrepreneurs
will be more collateral averse even though they have high quality projects.
Collateral in these cases could not be used as a sorting device anymore.
On the interpretative side, risk neutrality can be considered a realistic as-
sumption when we study the entrepreneurial risky activity in very poor en-
vironments6.
3 Market Equilibrium
We will study the two cases, wealth, W , bigger than zero and wealth equal
to zero, separately. Since bankruptcy is more frequent for type L, the bank
can use a collateral requirement to separate types. Nonetheless, if the en-
trepreneurs’ wealth is equal to zero, separation is considered impossible since
a contract can specify only the repayment R. In the case a bank offered two
different contracts with two different repayments, all the firms would choose
the lower.
6This quality may allow us to distinguish entrepreneurs from simple workers that usu-
ally are considered more risk averse.
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3.1 Case W > 0
If the entrepreneurs have sufficient wealth, W > 0, the bank can separate
types by asking more collateral to good types only. In this case, assume also
W ≥ Ch, where Ch is the amount of collateral the bank requires to separate
types. Firm H’s and L’s profit, with a contract of the type (R,C), are given
respectively by
uH(R,C) = W + ph(h−R)− (1− ph)C, and
uL(R,C) = W + pl(l −R)− (1− pl)C.
The bank can propose a pair of contracts trying to separate types7. Con-
sider the pair (Rh, Ch) and (l, 0) with Rh and Ch chosen so that the individual
rationality constraint on H types and the incentive compatibility constraint
on L types are satisfied with equality (consider for the remainder an outside
option equal to zero as to approximate the case of a very low self-employment
wage8) , so:
ph(h−Rh)− (1− ph)Ch = 0, pl(l −Rh)− (1− pl)Ch = 0.
The solution is
Rh =
θh− l
θ − 1 , Ch =
phpl(l − h)
ph − pl ,
7This Section equilibria are based on Minelli and Modica[15] assumptions.
8This could be the case of a two sector model, traditional and industrial, where in the
former there is a poor developed labor market with a very large supply and a wage that
can be normalized to 0, and in the latter firms can develop only with the help of lending
institutions.
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where θ = ph(1− pl)/pl(1− ph).
With this contracts, the bank can easily separate the entrepreneurs. Its
profits on type H and type L are, respectively
v(Rh, Ch;H) = phRh + (1− ph)Ch − I = hph − I and
v(b, 0;L) = lpl − I,
that are the full information or first best profits (that is project expected
value minus investment costs). If the expected value for the bank on type L
is negative, lpl < I, it can be proposed just one contract, (Rh, Ch), and only
the good firms will apply for a loan. The bank can again extract all the rent
from trade as in a full information setting.
Therefore if W is high enough, it could be used as a sorting device and
the equilibrium is efficient. Thanks to risk neutrality, the bank is able to
separate types without leaving information rents9.
3.2 Case W = 0
Consider now the case W = 010. This time there is no possibility for the
bank to use the collateral as a sorting device. What is interesting is that
in the formulation of the model, there is not an observable parameter that
could be used to screen types.
9In brief, (Rh, Ch) lies on the individual rationality line of each type.
10In these cases (very poor environments), the public institution is often asked to inter-
vene. W = 0 is a polar assumption useful to describe environments where entrepreneurs
initial endowments are not sufficient to put up as a collateral and the parameters do not
allow for a separation.
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Here a contract specifies only a repayment sum, R. Firm H’s profit and
firm L’s profit are respectively
uH(R) = ph(h−R) and uL(R) = pl(l −R).
By incentive compatibility, the bank will propose a single contract and the
entrepreneur will accept iff the expected payoff is at least equal to the outside
option. Bank profits from contract R are (take λ as the proportion of good
firms in the borrowers pool):
v(R) = λphR + (1− λ)plR− I if R ≤ h pooling contract , and
v(R) = (1− λ)(plR− I) if h < R ≤ l separating contract.
The monopolistic bank will set R = h or l in any contract to extract all the
rent. It will set R = h if pooling is more profitable, that is if
λ ≥ pl(l − h)
(ph − pl)h+ lpl − I
and R = l otherwise. So if the above expression is not satisfied, the market
equilibrium would operate with bad types only (but only, of course, if their
expected net value for the bank is not negative, that is lpl ≥ I).
If the bank makes losses on bad types, it will set R = h iff h(λph + (1−
λ)pl)− I ≥ 0, that is we would observe a pooling equilibrium iff
λ ≥ I − hpl
h(ph − pl) .
Anyway we could have only a constrained efficient equilibrium since a con-
tract accepted by good types will also be accepted by the bad ones.
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As we are interested in solving problems, from now on, we will consider
only inefficient conditions with the impossibility of using the collateral to
signal the firm type. Starting with this sort of equilibrium, the only way to
avoid a world without credit is an intervention from the sovereign authority.
The individual’s occupational choice, together with the agents payoff, may be
influenced by a definite political manoeuvre while comparing the consequent
costs and benefits.
4 Policy
Begin with the case of the last (constrained) efficient equilibrium and consider
the case where no collateral is available (W = 0) and the proportion of good
types, λ, is not so high to allow a pooling equilibrium.
If λ < I−hpl
h(ph−pl) no firms are operating.
4.1 The Interest Rate Subsidy
It is interesting and at the same time essential to consider the total (gross)
cost of different policy interventions before making comparisons. For exam-
ple, the interest rate subsidy is often cited and considered by governments.
In this policy the bank is asked to lower the interest rate but, thanks to the
subsidy, its revenue will be at least equal to that in the absence of policies
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(no credit position and zero profit):
λph(1 + β)h+ (1− λ)pl(1 + β)h− I = 0,
where β is the additional interest rate paid by the government to induce the
bank financing all the firms (the interest rate to refer is the previous h since
the outside option as workers is not modified in this policy11). The (per firm)
cost of this policy is simply (λph+(1−λ)pl)βh = I − (λph+(1−λ)pl)h and
we will take it into account in the comparison with the cost of our next policy
proposal. Whit this kind of intervention, all the projects (also the bad ones)
are financed. The equilibrium is again unconstrained efficient and the size of
the government spending depends on the absolute value of the loss generated
by inefficient firms (those who have negative expected value or pll − I < 0).
4.2 The Unemployment Benefit Policy
Again refer to the non-credit scenario. Before analyzing the unemployment
benefit screening policy, assume there are, for simplicity, n external workers
and n potential firms (note that for limited loans availability, only a part of
the population has the opportunity to be entrepreneurs). At the inefficient
equilibrium (no firms in), everyone works in the traditional sector where the
wage is given and normalized to 0.
11Minelli and Modica[15] have shown this is the most efficient policy (cheaper for the
government) in this kind of asymmetric information setting. Another possible, but more
expensive, policy is, for example, the investment subsidy where the authority co-finances
a share of the project.
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The proposed government intervention is as follows: it should impose a
lower interest rate offered by the bank (Rnew) with the promise of giving an
unemployment benefit to bad entrepreneurs to discourage them asking for a
loan. Again, Rnew, should be chosen in order to keep bank’s revenue at least
equal to its pre-policy profits, that is:
v(R) = λ(phRnew − I) ≥ 0,
where only good firms are considered.
It is useful to derive the employment rate after the policy intervention:
e =
nλ
2n− nλ =
λ
2− λ,
where e is the employment rate and nλ is at the same time the number of
good firms in the market and the consequent employees (firms have to assure
them a wage at least equal to the outside option)12.
The unemployment benefit will be calculated taking into account the
potential rent gained by the bad types on the contract with a lower interest
rate, pl(l−Rnew), or in other words, it must satisfy the bad types individual
rationality constraint:
(1− e)S ≥ pl(l −Rnew),
12In the definition of e all agents, the n simple workers and the n potential entrepreneurs
are considered. This is appropriate both in the case examined here where the unemploy-
ment benefit is granted only to potential entrepreneurs and in the case, that will be
discussed in the footnote 14, where the benefit is conceded to everyone unemployed. This
last case happens when the potential entrepreneurs do not have a label to distinguish
themselves from simple workers. Thanks to Jean Hindriks (UCL University - CORE) for
comments on this.
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where the left hand side is the worker expected payoff having normalized the
reservation wage to 0 and S indicates the benefit offered by the government
for unemployed entrepreneurs.
The policy must also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint for the
good types to avoid the possibility of announcing themselves as bad types:
(1− e)S ≤ ph(h−Rnew).
The per capita insurance sum is then:
S =
1
1− ephpl
l − h
ph − pl
and the repayment to the bank:
Rnew =
hph − lpl
ph − pl .
The repayment needs to satisfy phRnew ≥ I otherwise the bank would find
it optimal to propose no contract13. Stiglitz and Weiss [17] tacitly maintain
this type of assumption in a different setting though. In the second section
of their paper, when they analyze the choice of a single firm between two
projects (a moral hazard problem), the bank, implicitly, finds it convenient
the lower repayment designed in order to let the firm choose the safer project.
Without the assumption, we remain stuck in a no-contract equilibrium for
13Another way to implement the policy is as follows: the government could impose a
repayment level as to satisfy the bank zero profit condition with equality on the contract
with H types, Rnew = Iph . Then the two constraints (IC of L and IR of H) should be
satisfied giving an upper bound for the interest rate repayment on the contract for good
firms. It happens to be the same as before, Rnew ≤ hph−lplph−pl .
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0 < pll − phRnew < I − phRnew. This assumption is clearly not essential if
the government could also subsidy the bank if phRnew < I in order to reach a
zero profit situation and then consider this additional cost when comparing
different policy outcomes. To ease the exposition and avoid several subcases,
we exclude that possibility.
The final (per firm) cost of this policy is (1− λ)(1− e)S, where only bad
and unemployed entrepreneurs are taken into account. The new equilibrium
is efficient for only good projects are financed.
4.3 Comparison between Policies
It is cheaper to use the unemployment subsidy when:
(λph + (1− λ)pl)βh ≥ (1− λ)(1− e)S
that always holds when (letting γ = l−h
ph−pl ) :
λ <
I − pl(h− γph)
ph(h− γpl) ,
giving a wide parameters range to policy intervention comparing the last sum
to the initial inefficient condition14.
14If the unemployment benefit is offered to all unemployed (it is the case when en-
trepreneurs do not have a label to distinguish themselves from simple workers), we should
consider (λph + (1− λ)pl)βh ≥ (2− λ)(1− e), where (2− λ) represents all the agents ex-
cept the good firms. This option, ceteris paribus, enhances policy costs but the theoretical
result remains unchanged. See footnotes 3 and 6 that give an idea of how the analysis
should then be implemented if the policy cost becomes too high. We could, for example,
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Note that in the derived benefit sum we are not considering any sort of
(not-modeled in this paper) ’non effort’ utility from staying at home. This
parameter is obviously not important for the final intuition of this model but
it could be relevant for two reasons: first, it would enhance the numerical
conclusions for the policy cost would be reduced and second, a large disutility
from working gives the possibility of a benefit lower than a strictly positive
reservation wage. Note also that, with the unemployment benefit policy, only
good firms ask for a loan while the remaining bad entrepreneurs prefer to stay
in the labor market. This should be taken into account when deciding upon
the desirability of each intervention.
With the unemployment benefit, all the bad entrepreneurs prefers to offer
their labor force rather than run a firm. In the new equilibrium, the (and
only the) good projects are financed, the bank is at leat weakly better off
with respect to the no-credit equilibrium and we observe no inefficient (net)
losses.
Finally, we can compute the per capita expected income of a worker after
each policy to show the net gain of the employees as a category. The expected
payoff is higher under our proposal when:
0 ≤ (1− λ)[(1− e)S]
2− λ ,
where the left hand side term is the expected payoff per worker in a pooling
equilibrium and the right one is the expected in the proposed separating
take into account risk averse simple workers and a utility function considering both income
and leisure to decrease the unemployment benefit level.
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equilibrium with good firms only. At first sight, it could seem unusual to find
an unemployment revenue bigger than the reservation wage. This happens
for a precise utility function over income and leisure was not modeled. This
singularity, then, could be avoided simply considering a cost from working
high enough so the benefit is lower than a strictly positive reservation wage.
In the new equilibrium, reached with the unemployment benefit policy
intervention, only the good types are financed. The bank extracts all the
possible rent from them and do not care about the low quality entrepreneurs.
In a certain parameters space range, the policy becomes less expensive than
the often proposed interest rate subsidy and the workers as a category are
not worse-off.
This is only to argue that in the presence of credit market failures due to
asymmetric information, the possible solution can be attained also focusing
in an apparently distant market. The strategy, often used, of subsidizing
the credit sector may be less efficient than a simple intervention in the labor
market as to avoid the behavior of bad entrepreneurs. The latter may ask for
a loan just because they do not have a minimum outside option as workers.
5 Conclusion
In this paper it has been analyzed a simple model of asymmetric information
in the credit market when it interacts with the labor market. In the absence
of any policy interventions, we often observe a situation where the banks are
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not willing to grant loans for the presence, in the borrowers pool, of high risk
firms with negative expected value projects. Different policies could be im-
plemented, such as the interest rate subsidy leading to a pooling equilibrium
where all the firms are operating and the banks makes no profit.
It is argued that even an intervention in the labor market can change the
stable equilibrium with an interesting difference: only the good entrepreneurs
will ask for a loan whereas the bad ones prefer to offer their labor force when
they receive a sufficient unemployment benefit. That is, the way to reach an
efficient equilibrium is not only the one of giving money to the banks but to
assure a better outside option to workers.
With respect to the available literature, this paper considers the idea of
focusing in a certain market to solve the inefficiencies we observe in other
apparent distant markets. In the case studied above, labor and credit markets
are in some ways so linked as to allow policy makers to avoid credit rationing
just caring of workers’ welfare.
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Redistribution as a Device for Total Screening
in a Credit Market with Adverse Selection
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Abstract
A simple model based on Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) is analyzed.
Agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable, albeit not liquid,
endowment. The presence of adverse selection forces borrowers
to pose some collateral to secure their loans. When the individual
wealth is not sufficient to reach the threshold of collateral needed
by creditors to separate types, credit rationing may occur.
To solve the inefficiencies, different policies are available for
the government to implement. This paper policy proposal, namely
an overall redistribution of initial wealth, in general proves to be:
a) unconstrained efficient in the sense it produces a total
screening and not a pooling equilibrium,
b) cheaper than other alternatives and
c) pareto improving.
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1 Introduction
From the seminal paper of Stiglitz-Weiss (1981), an extensive literature on
credit market imperfections have shown how asymmetric information can
be the source of several inefficiencies on market equilibria1. The common
remedy, exploited by creditors to solve moral hazard or adverse selection
problems, is a collateral requirements chosen in order to separate types. It is
widely recognized that this instrument of screening, along with a type depen-
dent interest rate repayment, is sufficient to reach the first best solution. Of
course, this kind of screening is possible only if potential firms have enough
collateral to pose. This is not the case of the very poor environments in less
developed countries where, who has a feasible project usually has neither the
monetary sum to start up a firm nor the collateral to secure a debt.
In such environments, the sovereign institutions are often asked to inter-
vene to improve efficiency when possible. Recently, some research has been
devoted to pointing out some forms of legal interventions and, as a very brief
review, I will suggest to take into account the following three papers on that
topic. The first one is de Meza-Webb (1987) that suggests an investment
tax when credit market are characterized by over-investment. This is in net
contrast to the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) scenario. The second is Mankiw (1986)
that argued how investment subsidies can be beneficial for firms to relieve
their liability burden. The third work I refer is Minelli-Modica (2003). When
1See as a refresh, Bester (1985) and (1987), de Meza-Webb (1987) and (2000) and Innes
(1991).
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firms are too poor to operate they suggest the government should intervene
directly providing the necessary collateral to all potential firms. The credi-
tors, as a consequence, find it profitable to offer pooling contract and firms
receive the monetary gift only if their projects succeed. The authors then
compare this (constrained) efficient pooling equilibrium with the ones gener-
ated by the two most widely used policy instrument in developing countries,
namely interest rate and investment subsidies2: all three policies produce
pooling equilibria, but the money in a saving account and the interest rate
subsidy policies are the most efficient in the sense they have the highest dif-
ference between benefits and costs. They have the same expected cost for the
policy-maker but the interest rate subsidy has also the additional drawback
of distorting the equilibrium price in the capital market.
In the model examined here, I propose a different government interven-
tion: a complete redistribution of initial wealth in order to accomplish a
total screening in the population of firms. Through the redistribution the
authority should assure to all potential firms the level of collateral needed by
banks to separate types. As a result, the bank can screen all potential firms
and only good types ask for a loan. When the total wealth is not enough,
the government should pose its additional money and that is the cost I will
compare to the ones of other policy alternatives. For pareto efficiency, the
surplus generated running all the good firms will also serve to pay back those
2The interest rate policy subsidizes the bank by augmenting the loan interest rate
when it is not sufficient to guarantee a pooling equilibrium. With the investment subsidy
intervention, the government directly co-finances a share of the loan needed by borrowers.
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who contributed more to the public fund.
Every economist knows the pros and cons of redistribution policies. In an
adverse selection setting, redistribution can have the following unambiguous
efficient property. Instead of dealing with pooling equilibria, where the losses
generated by bad types have to be taken into account, this paper proposal
let only good firms operate. Nonetheless, if the surplus of all good firms is
so high as to compensate the entrepreneurs who initially had more than the
pre-policy endowment, we also avoid the consideration about adverse impact
on production incentives. In addition, it is shown the redistributive operation
is cheaper than other policy options in a very wide parameters interval.
Total redistribution is, clearly, a polar case used to point out how ben-
eficial this kind of intervention can be. In less developed countries, good
entrepreneurial ideas are usually not exploited for initial wealth is ineffi-
ciently distributed. If poor firms projects are divided into two types, good
and bad, policies that generate pooling equilibria can actually have negative
effects for a simple reason: entrepreneurs, who are at the same time poor
and bad, become, in a sense, justified to pursue their risky projects for their
outside option is very low. After a redistribution, instead, they turn out to
be responsible for the loss of their own new property in case of bankruptcy.
As a result, via the screening collateral requirement, bad-poor entrepreneurs
become aware on the nature of their activity and only good entrepreneurs
will have the incentive to run a firm.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The basic model is presented in
section 2. Section 3 computes credit market equilibria under asymmetric
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information both when entrepreneurs’ initial wealth is sufficient to pose col-
lateral and not. Section 4 compares two possible policies: the interest rate
subsidy and the proposed redistribution as a total screening device. Section
5 concludes with a numerical example.
2 The Model
A 1 period economy is considered. There is a traditional sector with a very
large number of identical agents and a potential industrial sector with a
continuum of prospective entrepreneurs of total mass 1, identified with the
interval [0, 1] representing each agent initial endowment, e. The distribution
of people over e is described by the cumulative function F (e).
The initial endowment is considered observable but not liquid forcing any
potential firm to ask for an outside loan to start-up a project. We consider
a monopolistic and, jointly, monopsonistic bank offering financing contracts.
Thanks to observability, every contract can be conditioned on the wealth
level.
There are two types of entrepreneurs with two different projects, A and
B; both require a monetary investment of I to begin operating;
Consider the same production function for each firm with two arguments,
1 entrepreneur and n ≥ 1 employees. The two projects differ in the final
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expected return, Exp[y]:
Exp[y] = f(1 entrepreneur, n workers) =

apa for entrepreneur A,
bpb for entrepreneur B.
In words, project A the high quality one succeeds with probability pa and
yields a return of a, whereas with probability 1 − pa it fails and produces
nothing. The other entrepreneur has a riskier project, B, that yields, in case
of success, a return, b > a, but with a probability, pb < pa. Project A, in any
case, has an higher expected product apa > bpb.
Assume project a has a weakly positive net value (from creditors’ view-
point), apa ≥ I, and project B a negative one, bpb < I.
As for the information structure, each firm knows its own quality. The
bank, instead, only knows there are two types of projects, good and bad, for
each wealth level. It also knows the distribution function over e and the
proportion of good types, λ. This creates a typical adverse selection problem
and the bank has to design contracts in order to avoid B types for they have
a negative net value (the bank makes losses with this kind of borrowers).
2.1 Main Assumptions
Take, for the remainder, the following list of the main assumptions used
throughout the paper:
Meaning of risky : the riskier project B is a mean reducing spread of
project A in the sense analyzed by Stiglitz-Weiss (1981). If we assumed a
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mean first order domination (see for this case De Meza-Webb (1987) and
Innes (1991)), with only two possible outcomes and in particular with firms
wealth equal to zero, any contract would be always accepted by both types.
This is in a certain sense the version of the paper where the bad firms have
a negative expected value for the banks.
Fixed loan size: the firms demand an identical loan of I. This situation
could be adequate to analyze credit loans to a pool of firms with similar
project size3. If the firms can ask different loan size contracts (as in Innes
(1991)), this information could be used to screen types. In these cases it is
difficult, anyway, to reach the full separation.
Monopolistic-Monopsonistic bank : the bank is considered to be monopo-
listic; most of the literature on credit rationing considers the credit market
to be competitive. For underdeveloped regions, anyway, the assumption of
monopoly turns out to be a good assumption to describe the prevalent credit
behavior compared to richer regions4. Considering the credit sector as com-
petitive gives also the difficulty of the non existence of an unequivocal notion
of competitive equilibrium in models with adverse selection. The monopsony
on the side of deposits collection, allows us to normalize at 0 the interest
rate paid on banking deposits. That fits the evidence in Italy too (see again
Bank of Italy report of 2002).
3It is a good approximation of the case of Southern Italy where around 75% of firms
asking for loans are very small. See Italian treasury report of 2003.
4The high spread between Italian regions is a plain evidence. See Bank of Italy report
of 2002.
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Risk neutrality : all the agents are considered risk neutral. This simplify-
ing assumption assures the possibility of using the collateral to screen types
under asymmetric information. Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) and (1992) have shown
that this property may disappear in a model of adverse selection where agents
have different degrees of risk aversion. More risk averse entrepreneurs will
be more collateral averse even though they have high quality projects. Col-
lateral in these cases could not be used as a sorting device anymore.
On the interpretative side, risk neutrality can be considered a realistic hy-
pothesis when studying any sort of entrepreneurial activity. This feature, in
fact, consent to distinguish entrepreneurs from simple workers that usually
are considered more risk averse.
3 Market Equilibrium
A contract between the bank and the entrepreneur specifies the amount ad-
vanced by the bank, I, and a couple (R,C) where R is the sum the firm has
to repay if the return is positive and C is the collateral required in case of
bankruptcy.
Had we full information, the optimal contracts would be (a, 0) for type A
and no-contract for type B since bpb < I. By offering R = a and C = 0 to
A, the monopolistic bank is able to attain its first best profits, apa − I, that
is project expected value minus investment costs. Note that if firm’s profits
were fully observable, the bank could offer a share finance contract and reach
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the first best again.
We will study the two following possible cases:
- individual wealth, e ≥ CFB where CFB is, as defined later, the equilib-
rium collateral the bank requires in order to separate types. We will see it is
considered a first-best level of collateral for the bank through CFB is able to
reach its first-best profits.
- individual wealth, e < CFB.
Since bankruptcy is more frequent for type B, the bank can use the
collateral requirement to separate types. Nonetheless, if the entrepreneurs’
wealth is below CFB, we will see separation is rarely possible (it is for singular
parameters values) and the collateral loses its property of screening device.
In this case a contract can only specify the repayment level R. Anyway this
is not feasible for, if two different contracts with two different repayment
levels were offered, all the firms would choose the lower.
3.1 Case e ≥ CFB
If the entrepreneurs have sufficient wealth, the bank can separate types by
asking a determinate collateral level, CFB. The contract assumes the form
of a pair (RFB, CFB) where the over-script FB announces that with this pair
the bank achieves its first-best profits.
Take, for notational use, (RFB, CFB) = (R,C).
To obtain R and C, we first have to derive firms and bank expected
utilities. For an endowment level of e ∈ [0, 1], firm A’s and B’s profit, with
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a contract of type (R,C), are respectively given by
uA(R,C) = e+ pa(a−R)− (1− pa)C and
uB(R,C) = e+ pb(b−R)− (1− pb)C.
We imagine every firm has initially deposited the endowment in a banking
saving account and, by the assumption of monopsony, receives the lowest
possible deposit rate (normalizable to 0). Since it is assumed there is an
initial traditional economy with a very large number of agents, we can also
normalize the reservation wage to 0. The participation constraint, thus, is
simply equal to the initial level of individual endowment of each potential
entrepreneur, that is
uA(R,C) ≥ e (PCA) and
uB(R,C) ≥ e (PCB).
Since the expected net value of B projects is negative from banks view-
point, bpb < I, the latter will try not to have bad firms in the borrowers
pool. The bank will propose the pair (R,C) chosen so that the individual
rationality constraint on A types and the incentive compatibility constraint
on B types are satisfied with equality:
e+ pa(a−R)− (1− pa)C = e (ICA) and
e+ pb(b−R)− (1− pb)C = e. (PCB)
(1)
The solution is
R =
θa− l
θ − 1 , C =
papb(b− a)
pa − pb ,
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where θ = pa(1− pb)/pb(b− pa).
With this contract, the bank can easily separate the entrepreneurs. More-
over, the contract can be modified so that incentives are strict and only A
firms will apply (Bs are out).
Bank profits on type A are
v(R,C;A) = paR + (1− pa)C − I. (2)
Since from (1)
paR + (1− pa)C − I = paR + pa(a−R)− I = apa − I,
it follows that the solution in (2) represents exactly the full information or
first best profits. The bank can extract all the rent from trade as in a full
information setting.
Therefore, if e is high enough, collateral can be used as a sorting device
and the equilibrium is efficient. Thanks to risk neutrality, the bank is able
to separate types without leaving information rents5.
Considering the continuum of entrepreneurs, total profits for the bank
are
v(R,C; e ≥ C) = λ
∫ 1
C
(apa − I)dF (e), (3)
where all good (λ) firms with wealth above C are financed.
5In brief, (R,C) lies on the individual rationality line of each type.
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3.2 Case e < CFB
Consider now the case where e < CFB. This time there is only a rare
possibility for the bank to use the collateral as a sorting device. It only
happens for a singular combination of parameters but it is in general not
possible. Assume it is not, so that the collateral is not a signalling device for
all e < CFB.
To avoid credit rationing for all poor firms, the bank could ask No Collat-
eral and a very large repayment level trying again to extract all firm surplus.
Theoretically, this operation is feasible for a monopolistic bank is not inter-
ested in an insufficient collateralizing wealth. In this case a contract will
only specify the repayment sum, R. As a result, firm A’s profit and firm B’s
profit are respectively
uA(R) = pa(a−R) and A will accept the contract if R ≤ a
and
uB(R) = pb(b−R) and B will accept the contract if R ≤ b.
The bank will set R = a or R = b in any contract to extract all the
rent. Since a < b, if R = b only bad firms would apply. This will never be
profitable for the bank since bpb < I.
If on the other hand, R = a, all the firms are attracted and the bank will
have to concede a pooling equilibrium contract. The parameter λ, showing
the proportion of good types, now becomes of interest in the analysis6.
6It is possible to consider the parameter λ as dependent on wealth level in a way such
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By incentive compatibility, the bank will propose a single contract and
any entrepreneur will accept iff his expected payoff is at least equal to the
outside option. Bank profits from a pooling contract R are:
v(R) = λpaR + (1− λ)pbR− I if R ≤ a. (4)
As a consequence all types will apply.
Clearly, the bank chooses the highest repayment level, R = a, but only if
pooling is profitable, that is if
a(λpa + (1− λ)pb)− I ≥ 0
or
λ ≥ I − apb
a(pa − pb) . (5)
Unfortunately the equilibrium is only constrained efficient since a contract is
accepted by all types.
When (5) holds, we observe that rich and good firms along with all poor
ones have the possibility of being financed. This hypothetical equilibrium
needs a assumption implicitly considered in the literature on credit rationing,
that is ∫ 1
0
edF (e) ≥
∫ C
0
IdF (e) +
∫ 1
C
λIdF (e). (H1)
that λ′(e) > 0. The intuition behind could be the incentive for poor firms to undertake
risky projects if they only lose a small endowment after bankruptcy. A λ increasing in
wealth would explain the lower probability of getting a loan the poorer is the initial asset.
See next expression (5). It shows the lower is λ, the more difficult is to obtain a pooling
equilibrium.
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The assumption H1 (a sort of condition for the equilibrium in the capital
market) says the total wealth, deposited in the bank, should be at least
equal to the money required to finance all possible equilibrium projects in the
best case. Namely, the first integral should be greater than the investments
needed by all poor firms (pooling equilibrium) plus the investments needed
by screened rich and good firms.
If the expression (5) is not satisfied, there would be a no-contract equilib-
rium. All firms with e < C and, evidently, all poor A types having a positive
expected value are not financed.
As we are interested in solving problems, from now on, we will consider
only inefficient equilibria with the impossibility of using the collateral to
signal the firm type. In these cases (very poor environments), the public
institution is often asked to intervene. Starting with this sort of equilibrium,
the only way to avoid a world without credit is an intervention from the
sovereign authority. The individual’s occupational choice, together with the
agents payoff, may be influenced by a definite political manoeuvre while
comparing the consequent costs and benefits.
4 Policy
Begin with the case of the last inefficient equilibrium and consider all the
potential entrepreneurs with e < C. Take the proportion of good types, λ,
not so high as to allow a pooling equilibrium.
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In other words, if
a(λpa + (1− λ)pb)− I < 0 (6)
or λ < I−hpl
h(ph−pl) no poor firms are operating for the bank finds that unprof-
itable. This represents an inefficient equilibrium from a social standpoint if
the following assumption holds:
λapa + (1− λ)bpb − I ≥ 0, (H2)
that is if, on average, poor firms produce more than the resources exploited.
When this assumption holds, it proves better to have all types of poor firms
financed rather than none.
In the next subsections some possible government policies are compared
to find the most efficient in this asymmetric information setting.
4.1 The Interest Rate Subsidy Policy
With this policy the bank is asked to offer the unprofitable pooling interest
rate, a, to all firms with e < C. Thanks to the subsidy, its (per firm) revenue
will be maintained at least equal to that in the absence of policies (no credit
to poor firms and zero profit):
λpa(1 + β)a+ (1− λ)pb(1 + β)a− I = 0,
where β is the additional interest rate paid by the government to induce the
bank financing poor firms.
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The total cost of this policy is simply the sum of all the differences between
the investment required and the average firm repayment:∫ C
0
[I − (λpa + (1− λ)pb)a]dF (e), (7)
and we will take it into account in the comparison with the cost of our next
policy proposal. Whit this kind of intervention, all poor projects (also the
bad ones) are financed7. The equilibrium is again unconstrained efficient and
the size of the government spending depends on the absolute value of the loss
generated by inefficient firms.
4.2 The Redistribution Policy
Again refer to the no-credit scenario.
The proposed government intervention is as follows: the government
should redistribute all initial wealth before any contract is made. Namely, it
should take all the endowments ∫ 1
0
edF (e)
and give every potential entrepreneur C = CFB. But things are not always
so simple and we have to consider the next two sub-cases.
7Minelli-Modica (2003) have shown this is the most efficient policy (cheaper for the
government) in this kind of asymmetric information setting.
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4.2.1 Sub-case
∫ 1
0
edF (e) ≥ ∫ 1
0
CdF (e)
If the total initial asset is sufficient to guarantee the same level of collateral,
C, to every potential firm, we get a full separation. The bank is able to
apply the screening system of equations (1) to every firm and all (and only)
A firms are financed.
It is worth noting there are no expenses for the authority.
For pareto-efficiency the redistribution is viable only if:
λ
∫ 1
0
(apa − I)dF (e) ≥ λ
∫ 1
C
(apa − I)dF (e) +
∫ 1
C
(e− C)dF (e), (8)
where the left hand side represents the gross bank profits after the interven-
tion since all good firms are financed. The right hand side is the sum between
the pre-policy bank profits (with only rich and good firms financed) and the
repayments due to the entrepreneurs who initially had an endowment bigger
than C.
4.2.2 Sub-case
∫ 1
0
edF (e) <
∫ 1
0
CdF (e)
If the total initial wealth is not high enough to give everyone C, the gov-
ernment has to intervene covering that gap. The total cost of this policy is
simply ∫ 1
0
CdF (e)−
∫ 1
0
edF (e), (9)
where the monetary expense clearly depends on the difference (9) and on the
specific form of the distribution function.
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Again we get a full separation. All good firms are financed and bad types
are not.
In the next section the costs of the above two policies are compared. It is
not, of course, an obligatory step in our analysis since the two interventions
produce different results in terms of firms actually financed. Nonetheless,
this becomes relevant if we want to have an idea about the sustainability of
different policy alternatives.
5 Comparison between Policies
The redistribution policy is cheaper for the authority when the expression
(7) is higher than (9), that is when∫ C
0
IdF (e)−
∫ C
0
a(λpa + (1− λ)pb)dF (e) (10)
≥∫ 1
0
CdF (e)−
∫ 1
0
edF (e). (11)
The expression (10) represents the interest rate policy cost as the subsidy
received by the bank. It is the difference between the total investments
required to finance all poor firms and the pooling profits the bank gets fixing
the common interest rate at the low level a. The expression (11) simply
shows the redistribution policy cost as the public money necessary to fill up
the difference between the amount needed to guarantee C to everyone and
the initial total wealth.
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In the next subsection a numerical example is presented showing there is
a very large category of distribution functions and a very large parameters
interval where (the interest rate subsidy is more expensive than the redistri-
bution policy. Here note that, for (6), (H1) and the fact that I > C, we have∫ 1
0
edF (e) >
∫ C
0
IdF (e) and (10) is always larger than (11) if the following
inequality holds:∫ C
0
IdF (e)−
∫ 1
0
λIdF (e) >
∫ C
0
CdF (e) +
∫ 1
C
CdF (e). (12)
It can be shown that (12) always holds when λ > C
I
. This gives us a shortcut
rule to derive a threshold level of λ above which (10) is always larger than
(11). Obviously, this happens for a larger interval depending on the values
of all parameters.
5.1 A Numerical Example
To clarify the meaning of all the expressions in the analysis, it proves helpful
to present a numerical example based on all the inequalities and assumptions
used throughout the model.
Consider, as said, a distribution of people over the endowment level that
can assume all the values between 0 and 1. For simplicity it will be used a
frequency distribution function as the one in figure 1.
[FIG. 1 HERE]
It is the classic representation of the descendent portion of a parabola of
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generic equation:
f(e) = 1 + α(1− e)α,
where α, the degree of concavity of the function, also represents a measure
of the proportion between poor and rich in the population. The higher
the parameter α, the more agents are concentrated close to the origin and,
consequently, the poorer is the population. In any case the total mass of
population (the integral of the function) should be equal to 1 so that the
vertical intercept corresponds to α + 1.
Despite its simplicity, the above representation can clearly be a good
approximation of the initial distribution of wealth in underdeveloped regions.
Consider the following numerical data, all satisfying the constraints of
section 2:
pa = 0.9 pb = 0.4 a = 0.6 b = 1.
It is, as assumed, pa > pb, a < b and apa > bpb. The project B produces an
higher outcome but with a lower probability.
With the data above, the screening system (1) requires a level of collateral,
C, equal to 0.29. The condition of inefficiency (6) says that if λ < 0.67,
pooling equilibria are not profitable for the bank and the government should
intervene. Take α = 4 as shown in figure 2.
[FIG. 2 HERE]
It obviously is ∫ 1
0
5(1− e)4de = 1,
that means there is a total population of mass 1.
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Total wealth (equal to the average) is∫ 1
0
5e(1− e)4de = 0.25.
An overall redistribution policy gives everyone a level of collateral equal to
C = 0.29. Since 0.25 < C, we need a sovereign monetary effort to guarantee
the same level to everyone. The total cost of this policy is 0.29− 0.25. After
the intervention, total wealth has the trend depicted in figure 3.
[FIG. 3 HERE]
One of the main concerns about redistribution policies is the effective
pareto-efficiency of the operation. To get through that, we need to satisfy
the expression (8) or
λ
∫ C
0
(apa − I)dF (e) ≥
∫ 1
C
(e− C)dF (e).
In other words, the surplus produced by all good firms with wealth below
C, should be at least equal to the amount needed to repay those people who
originally had more than C. In figure 4, this happens when the value of
the area below f(e) from 0 to 0.29 multiplied to apa − I is larger than the
difference between the area below ef(e) and the area below Cf(e) both from
0.29 to 1 .
[FIG. 4 HERE]
With our data, this happens when λ > 0.24 leaving a large room for
sovereign interventions.
Finally, the redistribution policy is always cheaper than the interest rate
subsidy when (10) holds, that is when λ > 0.36. This last result, as said, is
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not essential for the analysis since the two policies have different results in
terms of firm types involved.
6 Conclusion
Economists have widely discussed about the positive and negative effects
of redistribution policies. Some of them argued these type of interventions
causes inevitable reduction on production incentives.
This paper tries to analyze this topic from another perspective. In a
market (here a credit market, but the reasoning is quite the same in other
contexts) where adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral to se-
cure a loan, redistribution have undoubtedly beneficial effects. Namely, when
the individuals wealth is not sufficient to allow the bank to screen types, some
projects that may have a positive net value from a social standpoint cannot
be financed. In such cases, the sovereign authority is somehow supposed
to intervene. To my knowledge, the two most widely applied policies are
the interest rate and the investment subsidy policy. Both solve the prob-
lem of credit rationing but produce pooling equilibria with all types of firms
operating.
This paper proposal, instead, has the advantage of avoiding the rationing
and at the same time it generates a separating equilibrium with only good
firms in the borrowers pool. Nonetheless, the redistribution does not au-
tomatically imply a reduction on economic incentives if the policy is also
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pareto-improving. Total redistribution is, of course, a polar case used to
describe the beneficial effects this sort of intervention can have. It proves
extremely important when an economy has potential good resources that
cannot be exploited for the lack of information suffered by market partici-
pants. In this model example, the prospective wealth generated by all good
projects may plausibly be so high as to have a positive net value for the soci-
ety as a whole. The comparison between policy costs, gives us an indication
about the practically attainability of such a radical result.
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Outside financing is often considered one of the most serious
obstacles to a widespread development of labor-managed firms.
Usually, these barriers are provisional for they are based on wrong
believes or legislative constraints.
This paper analyzes the structure of creditors’ priorities in
case a firm goes bankruptcy and, in particular, money-lenders’
likelihood of getting their capital back. It is argued the dif-
ference between labor-managed and profit maximizing firms in
terms of efficiency (and moral hazard degree) can be affected by
a sovereign legislative act. This work focuses on the Italian case:
in accordance with the law n. 142/2001, labor managed firms
has turned to be less competitive from banks’ viewpoint for the
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ened during a liquidation. A proposed emendation may prove
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1 Introduction
The presence and economic sustainability of a system of labor managed firms
or other non-capitalistic production assets, heavily depends on the possibility
of persuading economists and politicians on the social and economic advan-
tages of alternative systems.
The literature (since the seminal Vanek’s (1970) paper has often focused on
labor managed firms with several observations on their productivity level and
growth opportunities. Most of the work has been devoted to the comparison
between labor managed (LMF) and profit maximizing firms (PMF) in terms
of final outcomes and global efficiency. In many cases the alleged superiority
of LMFs was founded on the possibility of a lower unemployment risk degree
and a higher sharing of moral values among co-workers. Nevertheless, one
can seldom find examples in the literature of great advantages of LMFs in
terms of productivity levels1.
Outside financing is often considered one of the most serious obstacles to a
broader LMFs growth. Note that frequently those obstacles are only based on
some wrong deeply rooted beliefs or legislative constraints. In a capitalistic
economy, the legislative structure may not be ideal for labor-managed firms
as it naturally evolves in accord with the needs of private entrepreneurships.
In particular, with respect to the available literature, this paper analyzes
the given structure of creditors’ priorities in case of bankruptcy (and so
the possibility for lenders to recoup their loans) may rise the moral hazard
1See Jossa (1999) and Vanek (1970).
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effect on cooperators’ contributions to the common cause. It is the case
of Italy, for instance, where in accordance with the law n. 142/2001 (and
subsequent emendations2), the position of the member/worker of a LMF has
profoundly changed3. Namely, his condition has been made equal to that
of subordinate workers and all of them benefit from a first degree priority
credit on non-immovable commodities in case of firm failure4. This legislative
intervention helps coo-workers not to suffer from a high entrepreneurial risk
but, consequently, lets them remain trapped in a simple prisoner’s dilemma
over their choice of effort level contributions. In other words, after the law
142/2001 the LMF moral hazard problem has turned out to be enhanced. So
if the banks are entitled to benefit from the liquidation assets after the LMF
members, they may not have incentives to finance workers/entrepreneurs,
especially in case of limited loanable funds.
In the model examined here, one monopolistic bank has the possibility,
2Law n. 30/2003 and order in council n. 270/2003.
3See law 142/2001. The Italian cooperative is only an approximation of a typical LMF
in the economic literature. Anyway, for our goals, in the case of outside financing models,
it is better to use the LMF other than the WMF approximation (WMFs are self-financed
workers cooperatives. The major problem in the WMFs is the famous Furubotn-Pejovich
(1973) effect, that is members’ concern about opportunity costs of self-financing in case
they leave the firm. In the LMFs the main concerns are represented, instead, by outside
financing and moral hazard).
4Before the law 142/2001 the state of uncertainty about the position of LMF members-
workers, surely did not help this firm type expansion. In general, jurists and Italian courts
did not consider a LMF member as a subordinate worker. See, among many others, Italian
Supreme Court n. 451/1998.
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for limited funds, of financing at most one firm, either PMF or LMF. The
expected final outcome of each firm depends on the level of effort exerted by
the workers (or managers) responsible for the project. Since effort is costly
and unobservable, this creates a moral hazard problem that can force the
bank to ration the credit.
The model also to show up one interesting feature of the moral hazard
problem suffered by LMFs with particular reference to the strong influence
legislative interventions have on firm types liability after bankruptcy. The
credit-repayment relationship between the bank and the LMF, compared to
the bank-PMF one, clearly has one stage missing: cooperators in a LMF
are directly responsible for their commitments, while in a PMF the moral
hazard on employees’ effort contributions adds to the moral hazard problem
of the PMF owner choosing the desired project. If LMF and PMF have
the same production function, that difference in responsibility provides wide
opportunities for LMFs to improve their reputation as safe debtors. For
instance, LMFs can save on PMF owner’s inspection costs of supervising the
employees and improve efficiency if they behave cooperatively.
Finally a proposed legislative revision, stating that after firm insolvency
co-workers should be entitled to gain only their pay as simple workers and
to risk as any entrepreneurs when they use other people money, will prove
helpful in restoring LMF credibility, leaving workers better-off and banks not
worse-off.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the market equi-
libria for labor-managed and profit maximizing firms based on the current
4
legislation on bankruptcy. Section 3 compares a PMF and a LMF to investi-
gate which is the most profitable for the bank as a debtor. Section 4 proposes
a slight emendation in order to enhance labor-managed firm reputation as
good debtors and economic efficiency. Section 5 concludes.
2 Current Legislation Equilibria
As said, we will take into account the current Italian legislation on creditors’
priorities in case of firm, PMF or LMF, bankruptcy. As regards chattels (or
movable property) and other non-immovable commodities, labor creditors
(that is employees in a PMF or members-workers in a LMF) are entitled to
be satisfied with precedence with respect to the other creditors5. With the
law n. 142/2001 LMF members and workers have been grouped in a single
category while, in the past, they were separated in two classes and only the
employees could benefit from the above-mentioned preferential terms. Before
the legal intervention, LMF members were only considered entrepreneurs
even if they give their services according to firm objectives6.
We imagine a two sector model. In the traditional sector, a very large
number of agents receive a self-employment wage working the land. In the
5Except, of course, trial expenses and taxes. See Italian Civil Code, art. 2751/bis and
law 142/2001 and subsequent modifications. We do not consider immovable property as a
guarantee for bank loans for, in this case, mortgages can affect creditors’ priorities in the
desired direction.
6See again Italian Supreme Court n. 451/1998 and Court of Cassation n. 1400/2000.
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prospective industrial sector, firms need outside financing to start up their
projects. Creditors face a moral hazard problem on firms behavior and the
environment is considered so poor that firms cannot pose collateral to signal
their types7. The moral hazard influences both PMF and LMF managers’
effort levels and for simplicity we will handle a two-outcome effort model.
Comparing just two performance results obviously gives the possibility of a
direct intuitive interpretation without any loss of generality.
The banking system is considered to be monopolistic. Most of the liter-
ature on credit rationing considers the credit market to be competitive. For
underdeveloped regions, anyway, a monopolistic bank is a good assumption
for it describes the prevailing credit rationing and the higher interest rate
contracts with respect to richer regions8. Considering the credit sector as
competitive raises also the difficulty of the non existence of an unequivocal
notion of competitive equilibrium in models with moral hazard.
All agents are risk-neutral. This is a good assumption when we handle
entrepreneurs behavior but it hardly represents workers conduct. In this
paper, risk-neutrality clearly eliminates some tiny difficulties present on risk-
aversion analyses, but, nevertheless, these difficulties are not so productive
since they would only enhance our final numerical solutions: at the end of
the paper, we consider the choices of LMF members-workers. So, if they were
7The no-collateral case is, clearly, a polar approximation of an underdeveloped firm-
bank economic structure. When firms can offer sufficient collateral, the bank can easily
sort types. See Bester (1987) and Minelli-Modica (2003).
8The high spread between Italian regions (see the Italian Treasury Report (2003) and
the Central Bank of Italy Data (2002)) is a plain evidence.
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considered risk-averse, for the fear of bankruptcy, they would exert high effort
levels with higher probability being, at the same time, satisfied with a lower
post-failure reform income.
In the following two subsections, we consider the economic implications
when a bank for limited funds availability can only finance finance either a
PMF or a LMF.
2.1 The PMF Case
Assume one PMF with a one argument (labor) production function. To start
up the project, the PMF entrepreneur-owner needs to hire two employees and
to ask for outside financing. The expected final outcome, Exp[y], depends
on the level of effort exerted by the employees in the form of a logic product
of probabilities:
Exp[y] = pxpxy
S + (1− pxpx)yB,
where yS is the production level in case of success, yB the lower one in case
of bankruptcy and px represents the probability of success (0 ≤ px ≤ 1),
related to the effort of a single employee, that can assume two values9:
px =

ph if the employee exerts an high level of effort,
pl if the effort applied is low,
9The product pxpx can represent all the combinations (phph, plpl, plph, phpl) between
the two workers effort levels.
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with ph > pl. For the remaining, efficiency will mean to exert the high effort
levels just because we consider yB so low that, for each x:
phphy
S + (1− phph)yB > plpxyS + (1− plpx)yB.
Workers analysis: before proceeding, we need to analyze the PMF
employees behavior. They have a given reservation wage, wR, if they decide
not to work for the firm. If one worker gets the job, he will have to choose
his level of effort contribution. We will refer to the implicit contract theory
or the efficiency wage model as it was introduced by Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984).
In their model the performance is measurable but unverifiable. Effort choices
are restricted to working, with effort level equal to e and shirking, with effort
equal to 0. If a worker shirks, he is likely not to perform very well and
therefore will be caught shirking with a given probability.
Consider a single worker choice. When the effort, e, is high, indepen-
dently10 of the other employee’s choice, his final payoff will be11:
Uh = phpx(wh − e) + (1− phpx)(wh − e) = wh − e,
where x = l or x = h corresponds to the other employee’s choice and wh is the
equilibrium wage level (to be determined) guaranteed in the industrial sector.
10When a PMF employee chooses his effort, he does not take into consideration the
other employee’s action, but only his responsibility towards the entrepreneur and legal
provisions.
11Thanks to risk neutrality we can also pose the cost of effort, c(e), equal to e.
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The worker gets the same wage level both in case of success and bankruptcy
for the current Italian legislation on bankruptcy assures the employee to be
satisfied (and so recoup his payment) with precedence over the other firm
creditors. This makes probabilities (risk) disappear. The effort, in any case,
has already been applied.
When the employee shirks (effort = 0), he does not incur in the cost of
effort, but faces the a probability, δ, of being detected and laid off, indepen-
dently of the other employee’s choice, so:
U l = plpx[(1− δ)wl + δwR] + (1− plpx)[(1− δ)wl + δwR] = (1− δ)wl + δwR,
where wl is the equilibrium firm wage (again to be determined) received with
probability δ, and where, both in case of success or liquidation, the worker
caught shirking, with probability δ, is not paid for the just reason law but
gets the outside reservation wage, wR.
Some remarks on the equilibrium wage level are in order. First of all,
even in the case (to be examined later) the PMF owner find it profitable a
lower probability of success for it is cheaper, it has to assure the employees
a payoff at least equal to the outside utility: (1 − δ)wl + δwR ≥ wR, that
implies, (1− δ)wl ≥ (1− δ)wR and in equilibrium wl = wR.
If the PMF entrepreneur wants its employee to work harder, it has to
assure a wage also covering the cost of effort. This equilibrium wage should
be at least equal to the low effort payoff: Uh ≥ Ul, that implies, wh−e ≥ wR.
At the high effort equilibrium, wh = wR+ e and, although the workers reach
(at least) the same utility, PMF expenditure will be higher (there is an effi-
9
ciency wage, wh > wR).
PMF owner analysis: consider the case the entrepreneur has no initial
endowment and cannot pose collateral for the loan. Assume the only tasks the
entrepreneur is assigned are asking for the loan and supervising the workers’
(managers’) action12. Bankruptcy means the final low outcome, yB, is not
sufficient to cover loan repayments, opportunity costs, workers wages and
related charges such as supervising inspection costs.
Consider the choice of the entrepreneur between paying an efficiency wage
or not. In the first case he faces an higher likelihood of getting a good final
outcome but pays more for the workforce.
If the owner finds it favorable to force the high effort level, the PMF
achieves:
phph(y
S − 2wR − 2e−R)− I, (1)
12That can be considered a realistic assumption for in most cases the managers are
the only responsible and competent for the business activity, as, for instance, in a joint-
stock company with distant shareholders. Supervising can be performed by the PMF
entrepreneur or by a third outside firm-worker. In both cases, after liquidation, they
would not have a credit priority with respect to their own firm laborers and banks.
Notice also that for the Italian law, entrepreneurs/owners can unlikely be, at the same time,
subordinate workers especially when they are the sole responsible for the firm activity or
when there is not the supervising of other entrepreneurs on their activity. Without further
control, the unique PMF entrepreneur could fix himself a firm job-position only in order
to defraud social security institutions. See Italian Court of Cassation, n. 3650/1994 and
n. 1053/1995.
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where yS − 2wR − 2e − R is the high final outcome in case of success net
of all wage costs and bank repayment, R. With probability 1 − phph the
entrepreneur gets nothing since, after bankruptcy, he is allowed to be satisfied
after the subordinate workers and other creditors (our assumptions make him
get nothing since yB is very poor). In any circumstance, success or failure,
the inspection costs, I , has been charged.
For the individual rationality constraint, the expected income (1) must be
larger than the wage level, wR, the entrepreneur expects in the traditional
sector.
If the PMF owner opts for less effort (every worker will shirk) he gets:
plpl(y
S − 2wR −R), (2)
where nobody will chose to work hard and where, of course, it is useless to
spend in effort compensation and inspection.
Now, interestingly13, yS−2wR > yS−2wR−2e and the PMF will be efficient
iff:
phph(y
S − 2wR − 2e−R)− I ≥ plpl(yS − 2wR −R), (3)
or (to get rid of symbols, take, without loss of generality, I = e):
R ≤ yS − 2wR − e(2phph + 1)
phph − plpl ≡ R
PMF
eff ,
13So, the model can be interpreted thinking of yS −2wR as the higher but riskier payoff
since it is still pl < ph. In other words, the distribution of final outcomes with higher effort
first order stochastically dominates the lower effort one (that means the average return is
higher, but not viceversa). See Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) and Besanko-Thakor (1987).
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provided the individual rationality constraint is satisfied.
Bank analysis: the monopolistic bank can decide whether to offer a
contract that specifies, in the absence of collateral, the amount advanced, L,
and the amount, R, the borrower has to repay if the project succeeds14. In
case of firm failure the bank is entitled to be satisfied, during the liquidation
procedure, after the labor credits which have a higher priority level. From
this, bank’s expected profits are15:
phphR + (1− phph)(yB − 2wR − 2e)− L if R ≤ RPMFeff (PMF high effort),
plplR + (1− plpl)(yB − 2wR)− L if RPMFeff < R ≤ RPMFmax (PMF low effort),
0 or no contract situation, if R > RPMFmax ,
where RPMFmax is the highest possible interest rate repayment the bank can
require when the chosen project is the inefficient one, that is when the en-
trepreneur rationality constraint is satisfied with equality:
plpl(y
S − 2wR −RPMFmax ) = wR
or,
RPMFmax = y
S − 3wR.
14If we allow the bank to offer a share finance contract, we would attain the first best
in any case. We do not study this case of interest in anti-trust analysis.
15Actually, yB could be so low that we should consider:
phphR+ (1− phph) ·max{0, (yB − 2wR − 2e)} − L and
plplR+ (1− plpl) ·max{0, (yB − 2wR)} − L.
To avoid useless complexity, take yB − 2wR − e and yB − 2wR to be bigger than 0.
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Clearly, if the bank asks a repayment larger than RPMFmax , no firms will
apply for a loan.
Since the bank is monopolistic, it will try to extract all possible surplus and
will set R = RPMFeff or R = R
PMF
max depending on their profitability.
Equilibrium is efficient iff:
phphR
PMF
eff + (1− phph)(yB − 2wR − 2e) (4)
≥
plplR
PMF
max + (1− plpl)(yB − 2wR), (5)
Notice in the efficient region (given all parameters space) the firm gets
positive economic profits (as RPMFeff < R such that phph(y
S − 2wR − 2e −
R)− e = wR ), while in the inefficient set, R = RPMFmax and the entrepreneur
gains nothing but his reservation pay (all the surplus is extracted).
It will be interesting to keep in mind bank’s payoff to compare it with the
following LMF solution.
2.2 The LMF Case
We will examine the possibility for two agents (They could be the two em-
ployees of the previous PMF) to run a LMF. They necessitate a loan from
the bank and we know, the latter, for limited funds, has to choose between
a LMF and a PMF on the grounds of its profitability (which firm is able to
guarantee the higher payoff?). With respect to the PMF case, there is not
the third figure of the entrepreneur supervising the employees’ effort. We
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implicitly assume the cooperators are as good as the PMF owner in asking
for a loan and (potentially) reaching the same final expected return16. They
do not (need to) supervise each other but face a prisoner’s dilemma on effort
contributions. Assume again risk neutrality.
The workers and firm analyses are, clearly, grouped.
Workers or firm analysis: remember the law 142/2001 has equal-
ized workers and cooperative-members. In case of success the cooperators
will perfectly share the final outcome, while in case of failure, the current
legislation17 allows them to recover their entire income-tax return. Again
bankruptcy means the lower return, yB, is not enough to cover all the oper-
ating costs (bank interest repayment and wages), but it could be sufficient
for the members to recoup their labor income.
Clearly, free riding on effort levels is the typical problem cooperators face. It
is better, then, to proceed drawing the payoffs of a single period prisoner’s
dilemma.
Each worker-member can adopt one of two possible strategies: he can either
16Remember the PMF entrepreneur’s only activity is asking the bank for the loan and
supervising the two managers.
17See the law n. 297/1982 that established the possibility for every worker of all cat-
egories to contribute and use a trust fund at the I.N.P.S. (National Institute of Social
Security). This institute, in case of firm insolvency, will directly reimburse the workers
for their last 3 monthly salaries and, most importantly, for the t.f.r. (end of business
lifetime pay deductions or severance pay), and will substitute the workers in front of the
liquidation official receiver during the trial procedures.
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cooperate, exerting an high level of effort, or defect, choosing to work at a
lower pace.
If he chooses to work hard, independently of the other’s choice (that is
x = h or l), his final economic profit/payoff will be18:
U (C|C) = phph(
yS−R
2
) + (1− phph)(yS−R2 )− e = y
S−R
2
− e if the other cooperates,
U (C|D) = phpl(
yS−R
2
) + (1− phpl)(yS−R2 )− e = y
S−R
2
− e if the other defects,
where y
S−R
2
is the one cooperator’s half part of the firm outcome.
It is U (C|C) = U (C|D) since the law, after firm failure, allows each cooperator
to get his pay independently of the other member’s choice.
For the individual rationality constraint, the above expected income must be
larger than wR in any case.
Two remark on the above expected income will be helpful: first, albeit on
the grounds of law n.142/2001, the income each member is entitled to recover
in case of liquidation is the labor salary and not the eventual entrepreneurial
surplus, a rational agent is able to fix its expected salary at a level including
the expected surplus. The law n. 142/2001 imposes a lower bound to each
worker/member salary (the each category minimum wage), but it does not
impose un upper limit. The minimum wage is fixed by a sovereign, govern-
ment or trade union policy and, not to abuse in notation, for the remaining,
18Actually, it should be:
U (C|C) = phph(y
S−R
2 ) + (1− phph) ·min{y
B
2 , (
yS−R
2 )− e− wR} if the other cooperates,
U (C|D) = phpl(y
S−R
2 ) + (1− phpl) ·min{y
B
2 , (
yS−R
2 )− e− wR} if the other defects,
but see footnote 15 and 17 about the law n. 297/1982 intervention.
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we imagine it corresponds to our wR.
Second, the legislation allows the cooperators not to suffer from the en-
trepreneurial risk (no probabilities appear in the expected return expression).
If the worker/cooperator puts a lower effort, independently of the other’s
choice, his final payoff will be:
U (D|C) = plph(
yS−R
2
) + (1− plph)(yS−R2 ) = y
S−R
2
if the other cooperates,
U (D|D) = plpl(
yS−R
2
) + (1− plpl)(yS−R2 ) = y
S−R
2
if the other defects,
where no effort is exerted.
Again U (D|C) = U (D|D).
Notice we always have
U (D|C) = U (D|D) > U (C|C) = U (C|D)
and, accordingly, it is not possible to escape from the dilemma. This imply
the LMF produces the lowest final expected gross product:
plply
S + (1− plpl)yB. (6)
Bank analysis: the bank knows with the current legislation the coop-
erators have no incentive to exert effort. So, to extract all possible surplus,
the bank will set R such that U (D|C) = U (D|D) = y
S−R
2
= wR, or,
RLMF = yS − 2wR,
leaving cooperators with wR as expected income.
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Bank’s profit will be:
plplR
LMF + (1− plpl)(yB − 2wR)− L. (7)
This is the payoff the bank will compare with its corresponding PMF
equilibrium revenue in order to decide which is the most advantageous.
3 Comparison between a PMF and a LMF as
bank debtors
To decide whether is favorable to finance a PMF or a LMF, the bank has to
compare the corresponding profits made with each debtor. With the PMF
the bank would gain, as explained in subsection 2.1,
phphR + (1− phph)(yB − 2wR − 2e)− L if R ≤ RPMFeff or
plplR + (1− plpl)(yB − 2wR)− L if RPMFeff < R ≤ RPMFmax ,
while with a LMF the bank makes
plplR
LMF + (1− plpl)(yB − 2wR)− L. (8)
For a LMF to be financed, we should get:
plplR
LMF+(1−plpl)(yB−2wR) ≥ phphRPMFeff +(1−phph)(yB−2wR−2e), (9)
or,
plplR
LMF + (1− plpl)(yB − 2wR) ≥ plplRPMFmax + (1− plpl)(yB − 2wR), (10)
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that means bank’s payoff achieved on a LMF must be bigger than any (low
or high effort) PMF solution.
Consequently, with the current legislation, LMFs are not financed if pl is
very low compared to ph. The LMF outcome is never efficient (the prisoner’s
dilemma always produces low effort equilibria) and co-workers only receive
an expected income equal to wR.
4 The LMF after the Proposed Reform
Consider the case where inequalities 8 and 9 are not satisfied and, accordingly,
the bank prefers the PMF as a debtor.
The law n. 142/2001 had the declared purpose of aiding LMF workers in
particular trying to avoid the ’hidden capitalistic firm phenomenon’ where
the cooperator status is used to conceal an actual subordinate relationship
just to benefit from advantageous legislative structures19. The law, instead,
has made LMFs less competitive than the twins PMFs in most situations.
This paper proposal needs the government to intervene in a different
manner to avoid LMFs segregation. In case of bankruptcy, LMF co-workers
should be entitled to get a wage payment, wLMFnew , as bigger as to make banks
preferring LMFs as debtors. In other words, we need to find a new loan
repayment, RLMFeff , and the above-mentioned w
LMF
new to solve the following
19For example, the law n.300/1970 is applied to LMF members except the art. 18 stating
the compulsory restoration of the employees dismissed for unjust reasons.
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system:
phphR
LMF
eff + (1− phph)(yB − 2wLMFnew ) ≥ phphRPMFeff + (1− phph)(yB − 2wR − 2e),
phph(
yS−RLMFeff
2
) + (1− phph)wLMFnew − e ≥ plph(
yS−RLMFeff
2
) + (1− plph)wLMFnew ,
phph(
yS−RLMFeff
2
) + (1− phph)wLMFnew − e ≥ wR,
where the first equation guarantees the bank a payoff on a LMF at least equal
to that on a PMF, the second represents the escaping dilemma condition for
each cooperator, U (C|C) ≥ U (D|C), and the third equation, of course, is the
LMF co-workers’ individual rationality constraint.
Perhaps it would not prove interesting to show the numerical solutions for
every parameter20, but it is essential to note it exists a very wide parameters
interval such that the above system holds. For example, if we fixed the new
wage wLMFnew equal to the outside reservation one,
wLMFnew = wR,
the above system always holds.
It means it is reasonable to allow cooperators to recover, after insolvency,
only their contributions as subordinate workers and let them suffer the risk
as any firm entrepreneur.
In equilibrium, in contrast to the current legislation case, we observe
positive profit for the efficient cooperators because RLMFeff < R such that
phph(
yS−RLeff
2
)+(1−phph)wLeff −e = wR, and not all the surplus is extracted.
So, LMF managers’ utility is larger that wR. Remember in the previous two
cases, the managers in a PMF or in a LMF reached an overall utility of wR.
20Algebra available.
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The bank is certainly not worse-off financing LMFs instead of PMFs.
There are no expenses for the government intervention. And only after the
proposed reform the LMFs can achieve efficiency and high effort equilibria
with no restrictive (in a parameters space sense) conditions. Spontaneous
cooperation also consents to save on (now) useless inspection costs.
5 Conclusion
In a very simple model, this paper shows the labor-managed firm profitabil-
ity (at least in the Italian case) is strongly affected by pervasive legislative
interventions. With respect to the available literature, the present work tries
to focus on a very concrete example where laws alter economic incentives
and production systems. Besides it explicitly expands the firm (PMF or
LMF) production function and costs to realize some of the famous moral
hazard problems on LMF loan repayment behavior occur just because co-
operators/workers have no motivation to assume cooperative strategies. A
disadvantageous credit priority over the liquidation assets may then force the
banking system to avoid LMFs as debtors.
Modifying, partially, the bankruptcy legislation, the potential and hidden
competitiveness of LMFs emerges without interventions on the technologi-
cal or production structure. When we let co-members recovering just their
contributions as workers and suffering from the classic entrepreneurial risk
especially when they ask for outside loans, LMFs turns out to be efficient and
more profitable as bank debtors. LMFs have clearly one moral hazard stage
20
missing compared to the twins PMFs: cooperators (agents) directly converse
with the bank (principal) while in the PMFs the moral hazard problem of the
employees about their efforts is followed by the moral hazard in the owner’s
choice over the firm project. The often alleged superiority of LMFs in terms
of democracy level or unemployment risk can also be extended towards effi-
ciency if the policy-maker properly encourages labor incentives. This paper
is obviously a first attempt in a very productive field of study. It is a par-
tial and static equilibrium model, but it gives the idea that the profitability
of a given production system is often affected by the private property law.
It means there could be a large room for a policy intervention in order to
render more attractive and efficient an alternative and democratic economic
system besides the profit maximizing one. Many times the poor expansion
of labor-managed firms is due to a legislative structure not suitable for the
needs of alternative-firm systems.
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How Trade Unions Promote Cooperation
Among Workers
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Abstract
Many of the alleged labor market reforms rely on the popular
view that the high and rising European unemployment rate is
due to several forms of harmful rigidities. The presence of strong
trade unions is one of those distortions this paper is trying to
understand better. What seems a wage rigidity may in fact be
the result of a rational game theoretical agreement for the good
of all workers, even unemployed.
By reducing the variance of expected income a trade union
can encourage cooperation among members and provide a pos-
itive insurance effect. In a simple partial equilibrium model, I
consider an economy where cooperation emerges in a given work-
ing category without compulsion. With respect to the solution
proposed by Solow (1990), I explicitly take into account the pos-
sible explanation of a wage above the competitive level and the
risky nature of each period workers’ income.
Endogenous enforcement claims but still exogenous preference
formation suggest non conventional implications for labor market
reforms.
JEL classification: J51; J65.
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1 Introduction
The theoretical and political success of the walrasian paradigm is partly
founded on two of the most controversial assumptions in the economic anal-
ysis. Namely, exogenous enforcement claims and exogenous preference forma-
tion. The first assumption states contractual claim enforcements are imposed
at no cost on exchanging parties. It means infinite and perfectly competi-
tive agents do not need to (and cannot) strategically influence each other.
The second one eliminates the endogenous shaping of preferences caused by
social-economic relationships.
Market interactions, from this viewpoint, allow neither for persuasion
strategies, nor for social norms and changes in tastes. All human features,
incompatible with self-interested maximizing agents, are simply taken out
from the neoclassical framework. Consequently, economic models become
not excessively complex and perfect business cycle forecasting devices. As an
example, labor market dynamics consider workers as isolated agents aiming
at their goals without the need of any human relationship. The market wage
level takes on all the responsibility of signalling given tastes and final choices.
Apart from several interpretations, precise and definite political implica-
tions stem from this subtle description. When a certain working category
suffers from a persistent level of unemployment, there is just one recommen-
dation for governments to pursue: cut down wage levels and encourage labor
flexibility. Labor institutions, social norms, trade unions are the lone culprits
for a sluggish, imperfect labor market response to business cycle fluctuations.
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Trade unions, in particular, are usually depicted as harmful instruments, just
taking care of a few strong and sectarian workers.
In this paper the possibility of endogenous preference (or utility) forma-
tion is not considered. Stigler and Becker (1985) have shown it is not always
necessary to get rid of stable utility functions to explain social behavior and,
I believe, the analysis would become unproductively intricate and open to
infinite subjective interpretations1.
New prospects come, instead, when the assumption of exogenous enforce-
ment claims does not hold. Here I will focus on the vexed argument of labor
market rigidities and consequent explanations. In particular, this work inves-
tigates the rational motivation for workers not to compete with each other
for the same job even if it means remaining unemployed for a while.
Instead of invoking social norms, I suppose workers to be non-myopic
income earners. It will be referred to the famous Williamson’s (1985) ’self-
interest with guile’ to recognize a more sophisticated agents’ behavior, using
strategic actions to achieve their ends. But economic strategies, such as the
ones used not to get trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma, are costly to adopt
and, for this reason, this paper will take into account endogenous persuasion
costs. I argue it is more appropriate and realistic to pay a price or receive a
rent to require or to guarantee an expected conduct.
In the following model, a group of identical workers can go for one of two
possible strategies when facing a typical prisoner’s dilemma. They can either
1Many studies blame the unrealistic assumption on reputation variables dynamics. See,
for example, Akelrof’s hypothesis (1980) of identical code of behavior among agents.
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cooperate with each other, planning to keep the wage above the competitive
level (to benefit from this when employed and from a reservation wage if
unemployed), or they can defect behaving as free riders willing to work for
less.
In a similar context, Solow (1990) showed wage stickiness would emerge
when overall cooperative behavior renders cooperation a best response with
respect to defectionist job searching strategies. He suggested infinite interac-
tions to give workers the opportunity of being instructed on the advantages
of social collaboration in keeping the wage at a non-market clearing level. It
suits workers to cooperate when the sector employment rate is high enough
to keep unemployment periods not so frequent.
With respect to that solution, I propose a different interpretation. There
are, in particular, two points I am interested in. First, the actual explanation
of a wage above the competitive level. Is it really appropriate, without formal
justifications, to take a certain wage as given (I will not address the question
in terms of a general equilibrium model)? Second, the explicit recognition of
the risky nature of labor income streams. Do not workers realize they face a
simple lottery each period between high and reservation wages?
To get an answer, I suppose workers voluntarily organize a trade union
with the aim of turning cooperation to profit. We know a trade union is in
a position to decide a monopolistic real wage as to maximize its members’
utilities. Some authors, however, argue that in most cases union’s member-
ship is compulsory or dictated by social laws.
The aim of this paper is to show that Trade unions can exist without com-
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pulsion and, with respect to the available literature, without incorporating
sociological factors into the traditional utility maximizing model. Besides,
I argue this organization raises the utility also by providing an important
insurance effect. Namely, at the maximizing wage, the employed is asked to
pay a membership fee to enter the trade union. At the same time, the un-
employed receives a member’s benefit besides the outside reservation wage.
The variance of expected income distribution is then reduced up to the point
where workers become encouraged to adopt cooperation strategies. Since
union members are supposed to take advantage of Axelrod’s (1984) Tit-for-
Tat strategy as a threat of termination, in each period they either receive a
rent or suffer a cost. The rent consists on the difference between the high
and the reservation wage when people have a job. Who remains unemployed,
instead, bears the consequent cost of using the endogenous enforcement as
a means of persuasion. The trade union insurance policy, anyway, supports
the burden of the aftermath2.
Finally, this model has clear theoretical and political implications. With
respect to the theory, we do not derive labor market clearing in equilibrium.
Since the unemployed would prefer to work at the market wage, we also
observe involuntarily unemployment. The key feature of the model is that
unemployment goes with higher utility level for every associate. In fact, the
jobless, joining the trade union, can account on a benefit compensation far
above the reservation return. If a worker decides to defect, offering his labor
2Bowles and Gintis (1993) would likely locate this paper in the upper-right cell of their
matrix.
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force for less, he knows he will bust the social insurance system. As a result,
retorsion strategies will condemn him to a lifetime reservation income stream.
As the policy implications, the most direct one is the impossibility of
persuading unionized workers about the damages of non competitive pays
and the advantages of complete flexibility. A better way here is to focus
on non-wage employment policy interventions. Lower wages, instead, would
imply a lower utility for every laborer.
Finally, notice that even without the trade union preference shaping
(through a non-well determined reputation effect), the external economic
environment is not given once and for all. Social norms are not considered
here, and we do not also need loyalty among workers for everyone is interested
in cooperating only to pursue rational objectives. Nevertheless, introducing
reputation variables would obviously enhance our numerical conclusions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a slight variation
on the basic model proposed by Solow (1990). Section 3 proposes a cooper-
ative equilibrium sustained by the presence of a trade union and Section 4
concludes analyzing some policy implications.
2 A Basic Model
One specific economic sector is analyzed. There is a large number of risk-
neutral workers and perfectly competitive firms maximizing over capital and
labor inputs. All workers are identical in ability and preferences, but have
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sector specific individual skills. It will prove helpful to briefly describe la-
bor market conditions when agents are not unionized3. In this simple case,
competition would allow firms to offer a wage at least equal to a given reser-
vation level. Labor market would clear with no possibility for involuntarily
unemployment.
Assume from now on, workers have the possibility, for unexplained rea-
sons, to keep the wage (that happens to be, again for unexplained reasons)
above the market result. Assume also each agent can adopt one of two pos-
sible strategies. They can either cooperate with each other, keeping the wage
at the high level, or defect, as free riders, willing to work for less (to avoid
unemployment).
If they choose to cooperate, each period they will expect to gain the high
wage when employed, wM , or a reservation compensation, wR, when laid off.
Denote this expected value with
EV = ewM + (1− e)wR, (1)
where e represents the sector employment rate.
With infinite market interactions, the final expected value of this alternative4
is EV + δEV + δ2EV + ..., or, for the properties on geometric progressions,
EV
(1− δ) , (2)
3This is a slight variation on the solution provided by Solow (1990).
4Here risk neutrality (or linear utility functions) allows utility levels to be equal to their
correspondent arguments, that are, here, monetary values (workers do not perceive the
risk).
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where δ is the discount factor (or the probability opponents meet again).
If a single worker free rides, in the first period he certainly gains a bit less
than the high wage (so for simplicity keep it equal to wM), but he knows
5 the
others will react with a punitive strategy until the wage falls to its minimum
level, wR. With the same reasoning as above, the expected payoff this time
is
wM +
δwR
(1− δ) , (3)
where, from the second period on, the worker receives the reservation wage.
From an infinite prisoner’s dilemma perspective, a worker is better-off co-
operating if the first strategy, ”cooperate when the other cooperates”, (C|C),
has a larger payoff with respect to the second one, ”defect if the other offers
cooperation”, (D|C).6
This happens iff
EV
(1− δ) ≥ wM +
δwR
(1− δ) , (4)
or when the employment rate is above a specific threshold: e ≥ 1− δ.
This logic produces an equilibrium wage over the competitive solution, a con-
sequent involuntarily unemployment and a precise arithmetical rule against
living off other workers stealing their jobs.
5I assume Tit-for-Tat punitive strategies. See Axelrod (1984) for a refresh on prisoner’s
dilemma escaping strategies.
6Since we are interested in Tit-for-Tat as a best response with respect to initial co-
operation, we do not need to examine the other two strategies, C|D with final payoff
wR + δwR/ (1− δ) = wR/ (1− δ), and D|D with exactly the same payoff. So, if defection
is a best response when the opponent cooperates, it is, of course, a best response when he
chooses to defect.
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It is important to observe that the previous result is based on the restric-
tive assumption of risk neutrality. Moreover, we need a proper explanation of
the rationale of taking non-competitive wages as given. Section 3 will argue
on these issues.
3 Trade Union Equilibrium
Assume the same economic sector as before with a trade union interested in
maximizing a given welfare function, V (.).
With regard to workers’ utility, consider U (.) as their Bernoulli utility
function on amounts of money with U ′ (.) > 0 and U ′′ (.) < 0. Workers have
the same set of strategies of the preceding section, but now are risk-averse
and voluntarily decide to join the trade union or not.
The trade union chooses7 a wage level such that its own utility, V (.), is
maximized. In the present model, it is not important to know the specific
form of the trade union utility function or the relative arguments. V (.) can
actually be the simple expected income of a representative worker, that is,
the trade union may want to maximize
e(w)U(w) + (1− e(w))U(wR). (5)
Whatever maximization program it chooses, we are only interested in the
solution, that is the monopolistic wage that, for notational use, we will call
7Actually, a single worker may form a trade union and make the proposal.
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wM even if it is not necessarily the same of that in Section 2.
With this simple program, and therefore by the presence of a trade union in
the labor market, it is possible to solve the first indetermination of the basic
model. In other words, we are able to observe and treat a wage level above
the competitive one without taking it as exogenously given. Keep in mind
that we are not interested in the exact value of the equilibrium wage, but
only in its future sustainability as an instrument of cooperation strategies.
The trade union is well-aware that when its members cooperate (treating
wM as given) they actually face a simple lottery, each period, between an
high wage when employed and a reservation one when unemployed.
This time, for risk-aversion, we have to consider the classic utility nota-
tion. Now we need to satisfy8
U (C|C) ≥ U (D|C) , (6)
since the specific form of the workers’ utility function now matters. Instead
of the expected lottery value of
EV = ewM + (1− e)wR,
as derived in Section 2, we have to consider the expected utility
Exp [U (.)] = eU (wM) + (1− e)U (wR) , (7)
8Risk neutrality helps not to consider the specific form of the utility function and to take
care only of the given argument. Here, with risk aversion (non linear utility functions),
we are not allowed to treat simple monetary values to compare the payoffs of different
strategies. So, the expected utility of each period income depends on the particular form
(degree of risk) of the function.
10
where, again for notational use, we consider e(w) simply as e.
Note with risk aversion, we have in every period
Exp [U (.)] < U(EV ).
Instead of inequality 4, this time we need to satisfy
Exp [U (.)]
1− δ ≥ U(wM) +
δU(wR)
1− δ , (8)
because agents do not perceive only the monetary value of their income, but
suffer the risk of an aleatory income too.
Notice that now it proves very difficult to compare the payoffs of each
strategy since we should know the specific utility function of the agents. To
be more precise, observe that in the expression eU (wM) + (1− e)U (wR),
we have a weighted sum of utility levels. So, even with simple utility rep-
resentations, such as the exponential or the quadratic form, the inequality
8 becomes too hard to manipulate. As a result, it is not possible to derive
equilibria or logic rules that are valid in general without an exact utility
representation.
So, we need to find a way to associate to each utility (or vertical axes)
value a single monetary (or horizontal axes) value without assuming a deter-
minate functional form. The remainder of this Section is devoted to finding
a new method of comparing the strategies outcomes as in Section 2.
[Fig.1 here]
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3.1 From Utility Levels to Certainty Equivalent Values
Remember that with a concave Bernoulli utility function, as the one depicted
on Fig. 1, the certainty equivalent, CE, of a simple single period lottery is
the pecuniary value such that
Exp [U (.)] = U (CE) . (9)
The key feature of the value of CE is that it is a single value and not a
lottery.
With R we name the risk premium level satisfying CE = EV −R.
So, each period union members perceived utility will be equal to9
U (EV −R) = U(CE), (10)
that, as said, is not a lottery anymore. In this case, the inequality 8
becomes:
U(CE)
1− δ ≥ U(wM) +
δU(wR)
1− δ ,
or
U(EV −R)
1− δ ≥ U(wM) +
δU(wR)
1− δ . (11)
Since we get rid of lotteries and the utility function considered here is
monotone, we obtain a single value on the vertical axes for each value on the
horizontal one. Consequently, now we are entitled to go on with monetary (or
horizontal axes) values. This allows us to obtain general results irrespective
of the utility function adopted by the trade union.
9With many periods, U(EV −R)/(1− δ) that is a series of certainty equivalent values.
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Cooperation now holds iff
EV −R
1− δ ≥ wM +
δwR
1− δ , (12)
that is an expression whose arguments are not utility levels anymore.
In this last inequality, we know EV but we need to compute the value
of R. In the appendix we show the way to isolate the risk premium from a
given, although not specified, utility function. Thanks to Taylor’s expansion,
we derive R = −1
2
σ2ARA, where σ2 is the variance of each period expected
income and ARA is the Arrow-Pratt measure10 of absolute risk aversion level,
−U ′′ (.) /U ′ (.).
We reach a market equilibrium when no agents is better-off deviating from
the current strategy. This notion corresponds to Grossman (1971) definition
of equilibrium in analyses of effective market exchanges.
3.2 The Insurance Scheme
We showed a trade union is able to find a monopolistic wage level as to
maximize members’ utility and encourage cooperation. In order to make the
analysis a bit interesting, assume that inequality 12 is not satisfied and we
are out of the cooperative equilibrium. All workers are then condemned to
the lowest payoff outcome of wR for any period of life.
Keep in mind that the monopolistic wage was chosen as to maximize
10Given an utility function, this coefficient gives the degree, in absolute terms, of the risk
aversion perceived by the agent when he faces a lottery between several possible payoffs.
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overall utility and a variation would cause unbearable unemployment and/or
loss of welfare.
Rewrite 12 as
e(wM) + (1− e)wR −R
1− δ ≥ wM +
δwR
1− δ . (13)
A feasible remedy to restore our favorite equilibrium is to reduce R up to
a determinate value, Rnew such that 13 holds.
It is interesting to note that we achieve the same result by reducing the vari-
ance of expected returns and, accordingly, augmenting the certainty equiva-
lent level.
To achieve that desired insurance effect, we assume the trade union requires
a membership fee from the employed, ²1, and provides a related sum, ²2, to
assist the unemployed. We consider ²2 as the unemployment benefit granted
by the union organization11.
Since the insurance system is actuarially fair (if the trade union is a
non-profit organization), we have
e²1 + (1− e) ²2 = 0. (14)
This gives an idea of the financial viability of the insurance system.
11Trade unions usually gain a great political influence on sovereign authority and other
social-economic organizations. Hence, realistically, we may consider another sum, ²3,
representing the transfer from other public or private institutions in addition to ²2. In
this case the total sum received when unemployed would be ²2+ ²3. Obviously, this is not
essential for the analysis.
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The new distribution of each period income,
(wR + ²2, wM − ²1), (15)
has the key feature of having the same mean, EV , of the last one,
(wR, wM). (16)
However, the variance of expected income is lower as well as the risk
premium level. See Fig. 2 for a geometric illustration.
Our latest version of inequality 13 can be written as12
e(wM − ²1) + (1− e)(wR + ²2)−Rnew
1− δ ≥ wM +
δwR
1− δ . (17)
[Fig.2 here]
The trade union succeeds to shift the yy′ line not parallelling to the old
xx′ for diminishing marginal utility and for ²2 ≥ ²1 in absolute values. As a
shortcut rule, note that 17 is always satisfied when e ≥ 50%. 13
Now the trade union has two instruments, wM and ²1 in order to maximize
the overall utility and satisfy the cooperation strategy. It is simple to argue,
from a quick inspection of figure 2, that if the trade union maintains the
Section 2 maximizing wage, wM , the expected utility raises to Exp [U (.)]new
thanks to a reduction on the variance of expected income.
12Utility function representations, as said before, are not necessary.
13If the union has a strong political activity (through the parameter ²3), we could even
assume e < 50%.
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We could solve the inequality 17 with respect to the union fee, ²1, for
example14. Deriving 17 or from a graphic intuition, it is possible to infer that
the fee, ²1, decreases when workers are less risk-averse. It happens because
EV is closer to CE and the risk premium is reduced (a less risk averse worker
perhaps belongs to a more elite working category15). The model also allows
the employment rate not to be so high as it would be with Solow (1990)
interpretation in a similar setting16.
When the expression 17 holds, the employed and the unemployed are
better-off if they opt for cooperation strategies.
Think about workers’ strategy when they either choose not to form a trade
union or offer to work for a lower wage. In the first case, we do not have
trade unions and, as said in Section 2, firms only need to concede at least the
reservation wage to attract employees. It is for sure a situation worse than
the very remote one of being in a trade union while always unemployed, that
is
wR < wR + ²2. (18)
14Algebra available.
15Economics sometimes refer to social norms averting the possibility of living-off other
workers for the same job. These rules say workers are not willing to offer their labor force at
a lower wage because it is considered unjust and humiliating. But most workers frequently
go through uncertain periods, so it is proper to limit social concerns in this kind of analysis.
This is a reminder argued, among others, by Piore (1975) and Bowles and Gintis (1975)
cited in Granovetter (1985). Here it is argued trade unions are mainly supposed to defend
non-elite job positions where it is more difficult to refer to non-economic rules.
16Here it could be, perhaps not realistically, even less than 50%.
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The second case assumes the other workers’ vengeance strategy leading
to a lower and lower wage until it again reaches the lowest possible one, wR.
With not excessively restrictive assumptions and still with exogenous pref-
erence definition, the trade union has proved efficient as an insurance supplier
and cooperation motivating arrangement. This organization, as mentioned
above, gives the possibility of observing (without keeping it for unknown
reasons) an equilibrium wage above the natural, competitive level.
4 Policy Implications and Final Discussion
Many of the alleged labor market reforms rely on the popular view that
the high and rising European unemployment rate is due to several forms
of harmful rigidities. The presence of strong trade unions is one of those
distortions this paper is trying to understand better. As a matter of fact, in
this paper, what seems a wage rigidity may in fact be the result of a rational
game theoretical agreement for the good of all workers, even unemployed.
By reducing the variance of expected income a trade union can encourage
cooperation among members and provide a positive insurance effect. This re-
sult is undoubtedly more requested in periods of extreme future uncertainty.
Agell (1999) refers to this as a genuine demand for economic security.
With respect to the relevant literature on this subject, although reputa-
tion variables and preference formation dynamics are not considered in this
paper, self-interest decisions are incorporated in a model of social relations
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where actors decide within a social context. Endogenous enforcement costs
and rents allow us to treat the pursuit of economic goals as a civilized, subtle
activity and not as a wild passion17.
An advantage of this kind of construction is the apparent redelivery of
power to economic analysis at the expense of political debate and future
behavioral science explanations. Without the help of reputation variables in
the utility function, it becomes even more consistent for workers to make their
choices on the basis of their lifetime income streams and to act strategically.
In other words, we merely observe a rational adaptation of individualistic
agents to their specific environment.
This idea, after all, needs the argument referring to self-regarding interest
as the main source of a certain social norm against living-off rules. We need
to be well aware of the importance of social custom on economics, anyway.
As said before, reputation variables would reinforce the previous numerical
solutions enhancing the need for insurance cover.
From this perspective, it is somehow obvious to turn on to efficiency
concerns. To avert untimely conclusions, policy authorities should verify
the presence of incomplete contracts when they estimate market outcome
efficiency (seeking for income insurance is a plain sign).
Trade unions may improve efficiency proving workers with the assur-
ance they require and with a significant protection in collective bargaining.
Endogenous enforcement claims but still exogenous preference formation,
17Notice the absence of the undermining process on useful or useless social norms. Here
the cooperation conduct is monetary advantageous and, so, hard to undermine.
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suggests non conformist inference for labor market reforms18.Governments
should focus on alternative (demand side) expansive labor market interven-
tions instead of persuading voters about the goodness of labor flexibility.
It is, of course, a partial equilibrium analysis. Further studies will try to
focus on the final impact on the entire economic system when trade unionism
is extended to more than one professional category. We will need, of course,
to take into account the effect on aggregate demand and supply when firms
employ fewer workers and people have a higher expected income to spend.
18Following Granovetter (1985), atomized behavior has not been eliminated transferring
the analysis to larger group observation. I simply recognizes the fact that an agent can be
part of a member group.
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5 Appendix
The utility level of the certainty equivalent, CE, is
U (CE) = U (EV −R) = eU (wM) + (1− e)U (R) . (19)
To get the risk premium, R (that is inside the function), we need to take
Taylor series approximations19 of both sides of 19. In the left-hand side, if
R is not very large compared to wM , we can ignore second and higher terms
in the series. So, we have:
U (EV −R) ≈ U (wM)− U ′ (wM)R
For the right-hand side of 19, we need the second order terms to derive the
Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient,−U ′′ (.) /U ′ (.).
So, letting U (EV + a) = U (wM − ²1) and U (EV − b) = U(wM + ²2), we
have:
eU (EV + a) + (1− e)U (EV − b) ≈ U (wM)− U ′ (wM)R. (20)
Solving 20, we obtain:
R = − (a2 + b2) 1
2
U ′′ (.)
U ′ (.)
,
where a2 + b2 is the variance of each period income distribution.
The Arrow-Pratt coefficient can be decreasing in the utility function ar-
gument. In our case, a decreasing ARA would clearly reinforce cooperation
strategies.
19f (x+ j) = f (x) + 11!f ′ (x) j + 12!f ′′ (x) j2 + ...+ 1n!fn (x) jn.
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 Fig. 1   One Period Simple Lottery with Risk Aversion 
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 Fig. 2    The Trade Union reduces income variance and raises Exp(U) 
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